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# USSR Report

MILITARY AFFAIRS



FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

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## MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

### GLAVPU BURO DISCUSSES IMPROVEMENTS IN 'RESTRUCTURING'

"Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Sep 86 p 2

[Editorial: "Accelerating Reconstruction"]

[Text] Colonel N. Shevchenko, chief of the political section for one of the major units in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany, presented a report entitled "Reconstruction Work in the Major Unit's Political Section in Light of Requirements by the 27th CPSU Congress" at the regular meeting of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Buro.

It was noted that as the leading element of the party agency, the major unit's political section is doing the organizational and political work to carry out the decisions of the 27th Party Congress and the April (1985) and June (1986) CPSU Central Committee Plenums, is energetically reorganizing the style and methods of its own activities, the leadership of party and Komsomol organizations, and is trying to increase its influence in achieving the qualitative accomplishment of combat readiness tasks and strengthen military discipline.

The political section is orienting leadership cadre and party organizations on accomplishing the demands of the CPSU Central Committee which include the fact that the reorganizational process must work simultaneously from the top and the bottom, that each communist must begin the reorganization with himself, with the activation of his own political and service activities, with an increase in his individual responsibility for the task assigned and for the end results. At the initiative of the political section, agendas at party meetings in party organization battalions and companies include "Begin the Organizational Process with Yourself" and "My Position in Reorganization is that I Will Not Wait, But Will Act."

The political section has significantly reduced the number of meetings, is showing better clarity and organization in leading the party political apparatus and local party organizations and is actively instilling such work forms as reports by communists, individual conversations, visual evaluations of how communists are accomplishing their service duties and social work, and the approval of party testimonials at party meetings. A business-like statement of problems in party life, the stress on working with people and not



with paper, the development of criticism and self-criticism are all developing an active vitality in party organizations that is characteristic for the present turning point.

Having taken charge of the reorganization, the political section has placed the task of making radical progress in the thoughts and psychology of cadres and active members at the center of its political and organizational work and is progressively stressing attention on supporting the communists' leading role in accomplishing their party and service duty.

The political section is now more objective in evaluating communists' activities from the point of view of practical work and results. The personal responsibility of communists in their attitude toward their duty is increasing. The political section is more purposefully directing the party commission's activities as it takes part in evaluating the accomplishment of CPSU Regulations by communists and their observance of state and military discipline.

The unit has developed an atmosphere of interest in and has intensified the study of documents from the 27th Party Congress and decisions by the June (1986) CPSU Central Committee Plenum, speeches by CPSU Central Committee M. S. Gorbachev and his 18 August 1986 televised statement.

Party organizations are being more purposeful in their work to select new replacements, educate them and accustom them to the Bolshevik traditions of the party solidarity of young communists. Also the net of company party organizations is being strengthened.

The political organization, party committees and buros are getting deeper into working with officer cadres, are increasing their influence on selection, placement and education, are taking an active part in their recommendations and are persistently instilling the new approach of evaluating the work of cadres not by words and assertions, but by the end results.

The initial reorganizational steps are giving positive results. The combat readiness of subunits and units is increasing and the training process is becoming more intense. The overall organizational level has increased and military discipline is stronger.

By giving a positive evaluation on the whole to measures that the political section is doing to carry out the demands of the 27th CPSU Congress, the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy Buro noted that the reorganizational process has still not reached all levels of the major unit's party structure. Some of the communist-leaders and party organizations, especially at battalion and company level, are operating according to the old plan. Stagnant aspects of combat readiness and political training and in the work to strengthen military discipline are only slowly being overcome in some subunits. There are still examples of indulgences and simplifications in military training and personnel are still being pulled away from exercises. The political section is still slow in realizing the directions of the June

(1986) CPSU Central Committee on increasing the demand on every communist and every party organization.

The lack of systematic planning, the discontinuity between propaganda and life and the underestimation of the sharpness of urgent problems, formalism and pronouncements are still causing a lot of harm in ideological work. At times, indoctrination in word is not linked with indoctrination in deed. Efforts in the indoctrinational sphere are not always directed at expanding publicity in the reorganizational process.

The Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy has demanded that the political section continue to: be more persistent in maintaining the innovative spirit of the 27th Party Congress and an atmosphere of creativity, adherence to principles and self criticism in their activities and in their work with cadres and political organizations; strengthen and maintain stability in the positive directions of the reorganization; constantly improve the work style and methods in leading party and Komsomol organizations and delve more deeply into the problems of selecting and placing cadres; study the state of affairs in units and subunits in a comprehensive manner, exposing deficiencies a timely manner, evaluating them on principle and taking measures to eliminate them; take notice of and disseminate anything new and advanced that is developed during the course of the reorganization in military life. Workers in the political section and party organizations are to concentrate their primary efforts on the vital work with people, training and indoctrinating the most active members, commanders and political workers in the practices of party and political work. They are to: orient the most active party members toward improving constructive work in military and party collectives, trying to center their attention on the focal points of combat readiness, unit and subunit training and strengthening military discipline and take the work that they have begun to its logical end; and reinforce the practice of conducting specialized exercises with political cadres and active members to study general party directions on issues of accelerating and reorganizing work according to new methods and exchanging the experience of practical activities.

It is recommended that they : more actively support and develop the initiative of leader-communists; strive for changes in their thinking and psychology and overcome passivity and antiquated stereotypes; indoctrinate officers with a high level of industriousness, a conscientious attitude toward the assigned sector of work, self-criticism in evaluating the results of their own labor and a high feeling of responsibility for accomplishing the tasks of the 1986 training year and the need to maintain constant contact with and be close to their personnel; develop the ability to train and educate subordinates, increase publicity in working with cadres and increase the authority of party references in deciding cadre issues.

The most important task at hand is to increase efforts to strengthen discipline. Mobilizing personnel to support regulatory order and training discipline, improve domestic life and support the rules of conduct for soldiers abroad and overcome officer negligence in their service activities

must be at the center of attention. We must closely monitor how communists with deficiencies in their service and conduct are turning over a new leaf.

In accordance with the spirit of the times, we must increase the role of local party organizations as the political nucleus of military collectives. We must direct a lot of attention toward reorganizing work in administrative party organizations and increasing their influence over the activities of communists in the headquarters. Reorganization demands that regimental party committees do everything possible to improve their leadership of the work of company and battalion political organizations. There have been recommendations that the path of the reorganization be comprehensively discussed at upcoming party reporting and electoral meetings. We should persistently strive to accomplish the decisions and resolutions that are being reached and to respond to critical observations and recommendations by communists.

In critically evaluating the reorganization in the ideological sphere, we must: especially stress the increase in the methodological skill of propaganda cadre, members of the agitation and propaganda department collectives and of agitation and propaganda groups; eliminate formalism in setting up personal speeches by the leadership; make it an widespread practice to elect deputy secretaries who are responsible for the state of ideological work and to conduct joint seminars of political organization secretaries and the various categories of ideologically active members in party committees and buros. It is recommended that an individual political day be prepared and held on the topic "Reorganize Actively."

Political sections have a special role in this reorganization. In accordance with the requirements of the 27th CPSU Congress they have been called upon to persistently search for the most effective methods and forms of work, free themselves from creative documentation, speechifying and expand the publicity aspects of their work, especially in leading party organizations. We must improve the practice of reviewing the work in units and political organizations during party committee (party buro) and party meetings and must regularly inform communists about the work of the political section, how decisions of the active party members are being carried out and how criticisms and recommendations are being followed up. It is advisable to invite the entire party committee or party buro to hear reports and lectures by party committee (party buro) secretaries at political sections.

We must elevate the leadership of Komsomol organizations to the level of contemporary requirements. First of all, we must get away from the hypnotic effect of favorable statistics and "numerical" evaluations on the state of affairs. Today, as never before, when working in the midst of army youth we must divorce ourselves from paper, get out of our offices and study the real processes and phenomena that are taking place in Komsomol organizations. The primary method for education must be working with individuals. Preparations for the 20th Komsomol Congress and reports and elections for Komsomol organizations are very necessary to increase the activity of Komsomol organizations.



It has been suggested that political directorates for the services of the Armed Forces, districts, groups of forces and the navy must persistently improve their style of leading local political agencies and must reorganize their work in light of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress.

12511

CSO: 1801/05

## MILITARY POLITICAL ISSUES

### PROBLEM OF FOREIGN LANGUAGE TRAINING FOR POLITICAL OFFICERS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by A. Antipov, chief of the Foreign Language Faculty, Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin: "The Mark of Professionalism"]

[Text] Recently candidates for postgraduate work at the Military-Political Academy imeni V. I. Lenin took competitive entrance exams. These included exams in foreign languages. Among those who did not pass the exams, there were many officers for whom the stumbling block was foreign language. This was also the case in past years. Characteristically, almost all those who did not pass the exams at one time had decent knowledge of the foreign language. This can be seen in their marks on the report cards affixed to their diplomas. But, five or six years passed and their knowledge disappeared. I remember many of the officers personally, you see it is mainly our graduates who are candidates for postgraduate study.

A similar problem frequently also takes place with some graduates of military-political schools who enter the academy. Already in the first lessons it can be seen that the base on which their language training is built is weak. As a rule, the majority have to begin to learn the language virtually from the beginning.

But, perhaps the VUZs paid too little attention to the officer's mastery of a foreign language? By no means. In my more than 40 years of practice I have seen how much is being done in this area. Complete programs have been developed, textbooks and training aids have been published in sufficient numbers and faculties have been staffed by qualified instructors. Specialized classes exist, equipped with modern technical training aids. Yes, and time is not lacking for the study of foreign languages. In addition to planned classes, numerous hours are also allocated to independent preparation.

The expenditures, including material expenditures, as we see, are high. And what about the result?

A substantial number of officers have a very weak practical knowledge of foreign languages. Why? Apparently there is something the VUZs have missed: some work we have not done, something we have overlooked, or some way in which

we are not using all the opportunities available to inculcate in the students a need to work systematically to improve their language knowledge.

But the main reason, in my profound conviction, is something else. The officers do not have sufficiently strong incentives to learn a language well. Once they complete the VUZ they, as a rule, do not find practical application for their knowledge and usually stop improving it and lose even that which they had previously acquired.

What happens? A great deal of funds and time are spent and, it turns out, all merely for the sake of general mental outlook. Is not the cost for this too high?

I recognize that sometimes there are doubts about this business I am in. Does an officer need knowledge of a foreign language at all? Perhaps today this is already extraneous?

During the Great Patriotic War I trained military interpreters and often also went to inspect them under front line conditions. I frequently saw how people who knew foreign languages were valued in their units and large units. They were, as we say, selling like hotcakes.

How can it be then, in our day, when combat is distinguished by exceptional fluidity and the use of the most powerful weapons and equipment, that there is no longer a need to know the language of the probable enemy? I am sure that this is not the case. And this knowledge is not only needed in combat. An officer, be he a commander, political officer or military engineer, if he is truly devoted to his profession, must, I am sure of this, continuously improve his knowledge, including by studying the equipment, tactics and prospects for development of the military affairs of the probable enemy. And without knowledge of the language this can hardly be done.

But in order for the language training of officers to play such a practical role, it is necessary not only to retain the knowledge acquired in the military educational institution, but also to develop it further during the course of service.

The main method of further improving knowledge after the completion of the military school or academy must be, in all likelihood, directed and monitored independent work on the part of the officer. But who is qualified to monitor and direct it? I believe this task could be accomplished by officers fluent in the language.

However, the same demands cannot be made upon all officers. No doubt a differentiated approach is necessary in determining the degree of mastery of a foreign language by various specialists, in accordance with the special features of their professional activity. In this case it would be advisable to resolve the question about the extent to which a given specialist must know a foreign language and what the content of his work should be in studying the language in the military educational institution and after its completion.

I believe that foreign language study courses in Officers' Homes and language circles in the unit could do a great deal to solve this problem. In my view, including foreign language lessons in the system of commander's training would be an incentive to systematic and mandatory study.

Needless to say, there may also be other ways to improve the language training of officers. But for this a creative search is needed, which encompasses all those who are truly interested, as it is stated in the CPSU Central Committee draft resolution, "Basic Directions for Restructuring Higher and Secondary Specialized Education in the Country," in ensuring that today's specialists, in addition to everything else, also possess knowledge in language.

9069

CSO: 1801/8

## ARMED FORCES

### CONVENTIONAL EXERCISE WITH USE OF MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 86 p 1

[Letter by Sr Lt A. Lunev: "Although it was a Non-Standard Crew," with commentary by the radio engineering unit deputy commander]

[Text] This comprehensive exercise did not come easily to us. A veritable snowstorm danced on the screens of the radar stations: They sparkled from the abundance of targets and were hidden by a cloud of interference, like an automobile windshield in the strongest snowstorm.

And then the "enemy" used weapons of mass destruction and our radar company was in the zone of its effect. "Centers of fires" arose at the position and the antenna system of one of the stations was "damaged."

But our trials did not end with this. A new exercise input was introduced. An "enemy" combat helicopter is approaching the position. Captain S. Maltsev, the company commander, immediately ordered the replacement at their posts of Jr Sgt V. Kuchkarev and privates A. Dibarulin and V. Sharipov. In our company these soldiers constitute the non-standard crew of the self-propelled anti-aircraft gun.

Under the leadership of Warrant Officer B. Lonshakov, the crew commander, the radarmen quickly brought the anti-aircraft gun to its firing position and opened fire against the target which had emerged from behind a hill.

But it was still a long time until the end of the exercise. The exercise leader threw an "enemy air assault" against the company. The anti-aircraft gun in the hands of the radarmen also turned out to be formidable weapon in the battle against ground targets.

During the review of this exercise the exercise monitor especially noted the confident actions of the non-standard crew.

Commentary by Lt Col V. Shelest, deputy commander, "N" radio engineering unit:

"Frequently it happens that in exercises all the efforts are devoted to accomplishing only purely radar missions.



"But in war this does not happen. Radar stations are among the objects which the enemy will attempt to destroy in first priority. Radar personnel will not avoid the attacks of aircraft, helicopters and diversionary groups. That is, they may find themselves in the situation which was modeled in the radar company where Sr Lt A. Lunev is serving. His fellow soldiers, as we see, demonstrated capable mastery not only of their main, but also of related specialties, including those of antiaircraft gun crew members. This success must not be viewed as a fortunate coincidence. Without constant, intense training such a result cannot be achieved.

"But is the training of non-standard antiaircraft crews equally effective everywhere? Unfortunately, no. Recently, for example, I saw this in the radar company commanded by Capt V. Bayev. His subordinates were very late in readying the antiaircraft gun for firing. Yes, and the gun itself looked as though no one had touched it for a long time.

"The one most at fault for such an omission is, of course, the company commander. But, I believe that we unit headquarters officers must more often include exercise inputs in our inspections which require capable mastery of antiaircraft guns by the radarmen and include a mandatory evaluation of the actions of the non-standard antiaircraft crews in the overall result of the military work of the subunits."

9069

CSO: 1801/8

ARMED FORCES

ARTICLE STRESSES THRIFT IN TRAINING PROCESS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Major Petrov, Red Banner Transcaucasus Military District: "Methodology and ... Economy"]

[Text] Combat intensity had ruled at the target range since early morning. Screens at the radar sites had been reacting to powerful interference and missile men had to resolve various types of exercise problems. But the face of subunit commander officer V. Kudrenko reflected calm. He was an experienced officer who had operated many times under difficult conditions and he was sure that his subordinates would handle the assigned tasks at the "excellent" level today.

A hardly noticeable speck of light flashed on the circular scanner screen. Operator Junior Sergeant I. Danilishin determined the coordinates and reported to Senior Lieutenant A. Ponomarev that the target was fast and small. But as the heat of battle increased, the soldiers operated less and less confidently and when the illuminated display flashed "Attention! Target in the zone!", they lost their heads and were not able to transition from the automatic tracking mode into manual because of difficult conditions of interference. Results of the subunit's range firing were not good.

There is something that one should think about in addition to this failure. If one were to judge by the outlay of electrical energy and motor resources, more material assets are expended per individual here than in the adjacent subunit. It would also seem that results would be better. The more the missile men work on the equipment, the better they should master it. But it seemed that the kilowatts of electrical energy and the kilograms of fuel that were expended to support the training process are not automatically converted into habits, ability and skill. In this case, the commanders did not work painstakingly and persistently enough with their subordinates, exercises were not clearly set up, they lacked intensity and the officers did not have sufficient methodological skills. And all of this was the reason for the fact that the expenditure of material resources is not being repaid with an appropriate return from training.

For example, take Senior Lieutenant A. Ponomarev's subordinates Privates N. Dondik and Ye. Mikhaylenko. The range showed their poor training level in

searching for and eliminating deficiencies and their lack of knowledge of the operating sequence for monitoring the operation of their equipment. The soldiers waste more time on these operations than one is supposed to and this increased the expenditure of technical, GSM [fuel, oil and lubricants] and electrical resources. And yet the battalion has a modern material-technical training base. Simulators and training equipment let them not only create various models of difficult aerial conditions, but also develop the reactions of specialists until they are almost automatic. And the main thing is that this has a significant economic effect. For example, one trainer alone, if used correctly, saves the subunit hundreds of kilowatts of electricity. Unfortunately the battalion had not done a good job in planing this out.

Exercise economy also suffers because of the leaders' poor methodological training. This is shown by the example of Captain N. Savenkov. He is for training crews, to include training in simulators. This means that he must think out trainer programs and construction to the smallest detail. He should make so-called "dry-runs" to make sure that the equipment works. But since he does not have enough methodological training and at times his standards are not high enough, Captain Savenkov has often had notorious violations. For example, during training, the missile detection display simulated targets of increased sizes. This allowed the operator to work under simplified conditions, without enough stress, and, in general, at times was distracting. There was very little return from this exercises. And there was a high outlay of equipment and material resources.

Unfortunately Savenkov is not the only such person in the regiment. Officers somehow have not become used to caring about the economic side of exercises. For example, while recently assisting in some training conducted by launch battery commander Senior Lieutenant A. Demin, I immediately realized that it was being conducted, as the saying goes, so that they could put a check mark in their training book. The officer went through the motions with his subordinates. Crews did not confine themselves to the normatives and people operated listlessly. But Senior Lieutenant Demin continued the exercise as if nothing were out of order. Were these economic expenses justified? When we asked the officer if he had thought about how much the exercise cost, his answer went something like this: is the concept of the exercise to get involved with economic calculations if expenses fall within the established limit?

This makes one think about a lot of things. For example, how we still do not train commanders at all levels to compare the results that they get with the costs of the training.

The commander has the major role in this. If the chief instructor uses effective methods for training his personnel, gets good attendance, and embodies the primary training principle "Do it like I do," training expenses are minimal and the return from the exercise will be great. But this necessitates working persistently to increase the methodological skills of the officers and their classification, all the while remembering the expenses and their subordinates' final indicators in combat training. Unfortunately it is not always done in this way.

Take Senior Lieutenant Demin again. He should have been wearing the badge of a first-class specialist long ago, but he has already failed the examination to raise his classification several times. Naturally this is reflected in the professional training he gives subordinates and has an effect on the economic side of exercises.

And here we must admit that we officers from the regimental headquarters carry a lot of the guilt in this area. We must not only monitor exercises and the quality of the preparatory training that instructors get, but also train officers in advanced methods for conducting training and be concerned about instructors increasing their classifications. Unfortunately, if one were to be self-critical, there are times when working visits that headquarters representatives make to subunits are only for "familiarization." For example engineer of missile and artillery services Captain V. Alesin visited the subunit commanded by officer Kudrenko many times, but instead of providing a practical method for setting up the work involved in training technicians and caring for material assets, he only pointed out shortcomings.

The lesson that the range provided was learned. People in the regiment came to the correct conclusions. The subunits are looking for and finding unused resources to intensify exercises and they are beginning the battle to economize on material resources. Commanders are trying to meticulously calculate the expenditure of motor resources, fuel, electrical energy and other material expenses and they also consider this when reviewing competition.

The headquarters has increased control over the fullness and, I would say, the intensity of every training hour. For this reason, difficult, instructive situations, rich in hypothetical settings are being developed for all training. Tactical problems are worked out in concert with other problems. A system has been developed for the methodological training of instructors and the individual training of soldiers. It appears that all of this taken together is allowing us to raise the lever of training and reduce the material expenses needed to support the training process.

12511

CSO: 1801/05

ARMED FORCES

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA EDITORIAL ON EDUCATION REFORM

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Sep 86 p 1

[Unsigned Article: "Political and Economic Education"]

[Text] The CPSU Central Committee has approved the resolution: "On the Organization of the Political and Economic Education of the Workers in the 1986-1987 School Year." The resolution poses as primary tasks more intensive study of the decisions of the 27th CPSU Congress; the generalizations and conclusions of the Congress related to the special features of the internal development of the country; the situation taking shape in the international arena and problems of further strengthening the defense capability of the socialist homeland.

In our day, during the period of restructuring, the importance of political and economic study is increasing significantly. It is called upon to arm the Soviet people with the ability to think and act in a politically mature way, and to stimulate them toward taking an active part in the restructuring of our entire life. It must have an active influence on improving the ideological maturity of army and navy troops, increasing the combat readiness of units and ships and strengthening military discipline.

During the past year the Armed Forces acquired definite experience in organizing the training process for many forms of political and economic education. Greater attention was paid to training the agitation-propaganda and legal aktiv in the University of Marxism-Leninism at the Central House of the Soviet Army imeni M. V. Frunze (Col G. Dubrovskiy, university chief) and in the University of Marxism-Leninism at the Severomorsk Naval Officer's House (Capt Third Rank B. Gannitskiy, university chief). Urgent problems of our time occupy the central place in the training of students in the theoretical seminar led by Soviet Army employee V. Khodyrev, and in the schools for the party aktiv headed by Lt Col G. Starinov and Maj I. Savchenko. However, not everywhere have formalism, dogmatism and superficial study of the most important questions of party theory and policy been eliminated in the organization of political and economic training. Some commanders, political organs and party organizations care little about seeing that the mastery of training material is closely linked to the practical affairs of the students, or that the living creativity of the masses is developed in every way.



It is important to organize training so that it is conducted in a lively and topical manner and fully takes into account the nature of the military, labor and social activity of the students and the level of their education and social experience. The mastery of training materials should take place in a businesslike, creative and discussion-filled atmosphere, and be inseparably linked with the practical tasks being accomplished by the military and labor collectives. It is necessary to free ourselves decisively from everything which undermines the student's interest in study and reduces its effectiveness.

It would be advisable to discuss questions of preparing for the new training year in political organs and party, trade union and komsomol organizations. In September it is recommended that meetings be held with propagandists and training organizers, and that they be given necessary orientation on the most important questions which are being resolved at present by the party, state and Armed Forces and provided methodological, reference and statistical material. Particular attention should be paid to the study and propagandizing of the postulates stated by M. S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, in Vladivostok and Khabarovsk, and in his address on Soviet television on 18 Aug 86. It is necessary to direct the students toward propagandizing and practical implementation of the requirements of the CPSU Central Committee for strengthening military and labor discipline.

All forms of training must be subordinated to the study of problems of the acceleration of the social and economic development of the country. Universities of Marxism-Leninism, schools of the party aktiv and schools for young communists will study according to new training plans and programs. The course: "The Acceleration of the Social and Economic Development of the Country -- The Strategic Policy of the Party" will be the main course in the system of political education of workers and employees. In all forms of economic education it is necessary to organize differentiated study of the course, "Intensification of Production," taking into account the specific nature of the production activity. These same courses will be studied during the coming training year in the system of komsomol political education.

In the new training year party committees and party organizations are being granted the right to select the forms of study, based on the particularities of their collectives and the nature of the production and social activity of the students. In the system of political education, this may be theoretical and methodological seminars, schools of scientific communism, schools on the foundations of Marxism-Leninism, political schools and mass forms of party propaganda. It is recommended that economic seminars, schools of specific economics and schools of communist labor be organized in the system of economic education of the workers and employees, and that schools for Young Leninists, schools on the foundations of Marxism-Leninism and schools of social and political knowledge be organized in the system of komsomol political education.

Training must help increase active efforts by employees in the struggle to use fixed production capital effectively, save material, raw material and fuel and energy resources and restructure the work of labor collectives on a cost accounting basis. It is necessary to involve actively commanders, political

workers and the leaders of party, Soviet and economic organs and trade union and komsomol committees in conducting lessons.

The training year in the system of political and economic education will begin on 1 October, and in the one-year schools for the party aktiv, on 1 Dec 86. The first lesson in all forms of study will be on the topic, "The 12th Five-Year Plan -- The Five-Year Plan of the Fundamental Turning Point in the Social and Economic Development of the Country."

A crucial task is assigned to political organs, party committees and party organizations in the new training year. They are to organize the work of further restructuring the system of political and economic education, take into account and generalize all the suggestions of communists and labor collectives, and discuss these suggestions in party organizations and in the press during the first quarter of 1987. The efforts of political organs and party organizations must be aimed at working out the most effective forms and methods of study, which meet the spirit of the times and the interests of combat readiness, and at generalizing and developing everything which is valuable in Marxist-Leninist education acquired since the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee plenum.

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## ARMED FORCES

### COMPLAINTS ON PREPARATIONS FOR WINTER

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 September 86 p 1

[Article by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Lt Col O. Nikonov: "It Is Just One Case..."]

[Text] It is already fall. It is the time to speak about being completely ready for winter.

But there are many letters in the editor's mail about shortcomings in this most important area of work.

Publishing today correspondence under the rubric "Winter Makes Strict Demands," the editors intend to publish materials under this rubric regularly in the future.

I went to this remote garrison not without pre-conceived notions. Well, I thought, another example of blatant bureaucratism. Two unit commanders cannot solve a simple question: Where to house young officers arriving for duty. The settlement has good multi-floor houses, an officers' barracks and a hotel. True, except for the hotel all these facilities are overfilled. However, the unit commander responsible for the hotel excludes officers from the other unit... A solid individual wrote about this -- Lt Col B. Levchenko, deputy commander of the "aggrieved" unit for rear services.

However, the conflict was already removed. The lieutenants were housed in the barracks. One could, of course, portray this as an isolated incident, caused by mutual offense, where, as it is said, both sides were at fault. This is even more so in that, as it became clear, the hotel was awaiting its rightful residents and it was at the very least inadvisable to house others there.

But after meeting with the lieutenants and the residents of the settlement another side of this isolated incident suddenly turned up and threw a better light on the problem. Some officials are trying to cover up their poor administration and even more than this, their negligence with eloquent words and reference to somebody's mistake. Lt Col Levchenko, and even the commander himself, knew about the replacements in advance and were obligated to prepare for this -- to seek out quarters, repair them, obtain furniture and set

them up. This is all the more true in that winter is not far off and one cannot tell it to "wait a bit."

When we arrived at the barracks where the recently arrived lieutenants were quartered, and the houses where the officers are living with their families, the "journalistic pointedness" of the letter to the editor unwittingly boomeranged to the author himself. I cannot help but cite these correct and clear words. As a matter of fact, Lt Col B. Levchenko's letter even begins with them: "Attention toward everything which concerns the individual, his labor, material well-being and rest, is the key issue of the policy of our party. To a large extent efficiency, frame of mind, health, and in the final analysis successes in military training and service depend on how people are quartered, fed and clothed, and how they rest after intense military labor."

The recognition of the importance of problems of good living conditions on the part of the unit deputy commander for the rear is good to see. However, it turned out to be merely words, the appearance of understanding.

In the room where lieutenants S. Donyukov, N. Babakov and A. Burbel reside there was no furniture except for beds. Cold wind blew through holes in the window frames. Moss was growing on the walls and there were mushrooms all over the floor. There was no hot water.

"The heating system is not ready yet," explained Levchenko about the water.

"But we are on the threshold of winter!"

We enter the apartment where the family of Sr Lt V. Yarulin is living for the third year. I was not able to speak with him, he was at work. Right at the entrance way the air was thick with humidity. There were dark streams on the walls.

"It is the first floor;" Lt Col Levchenko threw up his arms, "mistakes by the builders."

"What builders? Asked the lady of the house in indignation. "The house has been poorly heated for all these years, the radiators are barely warm. The child is always sick. No matter where I turned it was no use. No one even wants to listen. And you too! The KECh [barrack services unit] refers us to you, you put the blame on the KECh, and no solution will be found.

It is difficult to answer optimistically today what awaits the residents when the cold weather comes. The schedule for repair of boilers and boiler equipment and the heating systems has long been disrupted. In many houses the stairwells and attics are not heated. In the majority of cases the insulation of the heating system needs to be replaced.

Alas, at this time the military settlement is not ready for winter.

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## ARMED FORCES

### EDITORS LOOK AT FAILURE TO RESPOND TO COMPLAINTS

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 10 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Col A. Drovosekov and Capt 1st Rank M. Shashuto: "No Response Came..."]

[Text] Letters to the editor...in them are found the spirit of the times, its soul, the present day of our country, a reflection of the restructuring of the psychology and views of people and the increasing activeness of their stance in life.

Letters are suggestions aimed at improving military training and raising the level of combat readiness, using economic reserves and improving material and everyday support. But frequently they contain requests and complaints. Their authors are sure that the editors will help and that truth necessarily will triumph.

But why the editors? It is because the person has lost hope of satisfying his request at the levels to which he appealed. At one of those levels an official turned out to be deaf to someone else's concern, at another he was forgetful and did not remember his promises, and a third gave a hazy assertion that he would "coordinate," "make known," or "air the problem." And sometimes it also happens that it is difficult for the person to determine where exactly his problem is hung up in red tape and who is at fault for this.

Thus, in the fall of 1985 a recommendation was written to promote Capt P. Goncharuk. Before he left for the DRA [Democratic Republic of Afghanistan], where he was sent on 4 December of that year, Goncharuk inquired at the Kiev Military District Cadres Directorate about how the matter of his promotion would be resolved. He was assured that the recommendation for the new rank would be sent after him.

When he arrived at his new duty station Goncharuk mentioned the recommendation which, apparently, had already been sent from the Kiev Military District. The officer was told that everything would be done which should be done in such cases.

The year 1986 came. January, February and March passed. There was no news about the recommendation. In May Goncharuk requested that KRASNAYA ZVEZDA



assist him to find the lost "certificate." The editors sent his letter to the Kiev Military District Cadres Directorate, and so informed Goncharuk.

It seemed that the matter would be resolved. But no! In August the officer received a letter stating that a reply had come from the Kiev Military District to the request made by his unit, which stated that the documents had been sent. And his unit answered that the documents have not been received. This is the situation.

At the request of the editors our correspondent attempted to learn the fate of the recommendation. There are no personnel records of Goncharuk here and no traces could be found that the recommendation had arrived from the Kiev Military District. In short, the situation is that they were sent from the Kiev Military District but not received at his place of assignment. So where had the document gotten stuck? I believe that the appropriate commanders will still look into this story and find those who were at fault for this incident.

In the immediate future Capt Goncharuk will be promoted to major. But a year of waiting and troubles were necessary for this, not to mention the spoiled frame of mind of the officer.

Bureaucratism and indifference are among the main reasons for complaints. It is precisely these things which often force a person to take up the pen and knock at the door of various departments. Guards Captain N. Zykov also was forced to appeal to the editors, because he became convinced that locally everyone was brushing aside his request and no one wanted to get involved in his situation.

And his situation was this. Zykov's term of service in the USSR Armed Forces ended in January 1986. The officer counted on the documents for his release being worked up in the spring or in early summer, but the matter dragged out. Knowing that he would not be able to speed up matters through his own efforts, he wrote to KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: "Help!" The editors sent his letter to the Far East Military District Cadres Directorate.

This was in June. In August Zykov again reminded us about himself. He had not received an answer from the Far East Military District Cadres Directorate. His request at his place of duty did not bring results. "Meanwhile it will soon be winter," writes the officer, "and in the winter in the climate here it will be very very difficult to move with the family. How long can this bureaucratic red tape with my discharge drag out? If the documents cannot get past the first level in four months, then how much time will be required for them to go further. Is there truly no justice for those responsible for this red tape?"

Needless to say, there is justice. The law provides punishment for callousness, indifference, red tape and a disdainful attitude toward letters. Unfortunately, the cases when someone was seriously punished for formalistic replies or for disassociating himself from justifiable complaints and requests are extremely rare. Here one wonders whether it is not for this reason that irresponsibility has always flourished in places where there was no accountability for matters entrusted to one.

It has already been six years that Great Patriotic War participant I. Pushilkin from Baku has been petitioning about the installation of a telephone, which he bitterly discussed in a letter to KRA SNAYA ZVEZDA. In March of this year his complaint was sent to the AzSSR Ministry of Communications. In May a message was received from the veteran's grandson stating that there had been no answer from the ministry and that the matter of the telephone has not been resolved.

In August Pushilkin himself informed us: "As before, no answer has been received from the Ministry. I request your assistance."

It is entirely understandable that the installation of an apartment telephone is a difficult problem. Here, speaking in the language of communicators, there are not always "technical capabilities." Well, what interfered with giving the veteran an answer within the established time period? Was this also due to a lack of technical capabilities? Needless to say, it was not. Such cases reflect the lack of an attitude of respect toward the individual and of sensitivity and attentiveness to his needs. Unfortunately, there are numerous such cases.

Early this year the editors sent a letter from PFC K. Mustafayev to the AzSSR Republic Military Commissariat, in which he asked whether the rayon military commissariat's office had acted properly at the time he was called up into the army. The soldier then discussed his family situation.

How much time is needed to check out the soldier's letter, considering that it did not even have to go anywhere? Mustafayev was called up from Baku. But it has been eight months already and he has still not received an answer. Therefore, he appealed a second time to the editors.

Among the letters in which the authors complained that they received no replies, I would like to single out that of war veteran N. Sobol. In May of this year he wrote to the editors that in Kharkov, where he lives, it is not possible to buy ribbons and bars for medals. His letter was sent to the Kiev Military District chief of the Trade Directorate. In August Sobol again wrote the editors. He had not received an answer from the chief of the Trade Directorate. But the veteran does not even consider this to be the most important thing. What is important is that in the military trade store there were not and are not any ribbons and medals for military orders.

Is this perhaps some serious problem? N. Sobol does not think so. He writes that "neither large capital expenditures, nor restructuring of production is necessary to solve it. What is necessary is a restructuring of thinking, a restructuring in attitude toward the job and toward one's official duties." Let us add that it is also necessary to restructure the work of responding to letters.

It is no secret that a serious attitude toward checking up on letters, taking effective measures, and real attention toward people's needs and requests would reduce many fold the number of complaints and repeated appeals. But as the editor's mail shows, there is still a tendency toward the old practice,

when some officials handled letters according to the principle: "Pass the buck." Letters were sent from department to department and the writer received placating and reassuring answers. The appearance of attention to the letter was created, and the individual seeking a solution to his problem was forced to appeal not to the rayon, and even not to the oblast, but to Moscow. This was the natural result of the bureaucratic and indifferent attitude toward the letter at the local levels.

Today, at the turning point stage, when maximum efficiency is required, the party is waging a resolute struggle against bureaucratism, which has become a serious obstacle in the path of transformation. This is why commanders, political organs and party organizations must pay constant attention to the state of work with letters. And the demands made on the quality of this work must be strict and principled, in the party manner.

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ARMED FORCES

BRIEFS

OBITUARY: Major General V. Ya. Ryazantsev--His military friends and comrades report with deep sorrow the death of Major General Ryazantsev, Vladimir Yakovlevich, a CPSU member since 1959, and express their condolences to the relatives and friends of the deceased. [Text] [Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Sep 86 p 4] 9069

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## SPECIAL TROOPS

### SPECIALIZED PRODUCTION SHOPS BACKED FOR MILITARY CONSTRUCTION

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 3 Sep 86 p 1

[Article by reserve Colonel N. Vinogradov: "Time Does Not Wait -- What Is Slowing The Spread of the Foremost Experience in Military Construction?"]

[Text] The construction site seemed devoid of people -- there were only seven or eight. But in this case the topic at hand is not the dispersal of the work force.

Military construction organization chief Colonel F. Kapura explains, "There is simply no need to have more people when constructing a boiler-room using the unit-set method. The primary assembly work is done under factory conditions. Therefore there is an approximately 2500-hour savings in labor expenses. Last year we used this progressive method in assembling several boiler-rooms. And we were able to complete all the work quickly and with quality."

The "Basic Trends in USSR Economic and Social Development in 1986-1990 and in the Period Until 2000" includes "Consistently conducting further industrialization in construction production, transforming it into a single process for erecting objectives from factory-fabricated elements. Transitioning to delivering sets of engineer and industrial equipment with reinforced blocks to construction sites."

The military construction organization headed by Colonel Kapura is rigidly following this course. The introduction of industrial units in this organization is increasing from year to year. And the use of advanced assembly methods has allowed the collective not only to reduce the number of personnel working on sites. There has also been an increase in the annual worker salary which now exceeds 20,000 rubles.

To expand the use of industrial units in the enterprise where Colonel Ye. Chernov is the chief, a new workshop was constructed through the enterprise's own efforts. A former warehouse was transformed into this workshop and its size and equipment level are impressive. The enterprise's chief engineer, Lieutenant Colonel V. Murzin, and the workshop chief, Soviet Army employee S. Meshcheryakov, inspect the entire industrial process starting with steel



cutting and the frame preparation and ending with the assembly of the units. Medium pressure boilers are lined at one of the work positions. Instead of the work-intensive, so-called "wet" process, this location uses light-weight tiles which allow them to reduce the block weight by almost fifty percent.

Military construction personnel are working in this workshop, as in others. Among the best are the brigade headed by Private Yu. Skalskim.

"Time passes, and its time to think about expanding the production of these blocks and improving their production," says Lieutenant Colonel V. Murzin, sharing his plans.

The creation of such special workshops, highly mechanized and with technology that has been thought out in detail, is also the primary direction for producing unit-set assembly operations. But unfortunately the capital construction system in the USSR Ministry of Defense has very few such workshops that produce unitized boiler-rooms. Construction personnel from other military districts are still coming here to imitate the experience and use it themselves. And although the advantages of unit assembly are obvious, it has still not found wide-spread use.

What is holding up the adoption of this advanced construction method? It is primarily the fact that there are no precise, clear prospects and plans for its large-scale adoption. There is even a lack of unity in the use of the "unit-block assembly method" concept itself. There has been no evaluation of the level of site prefabricated construction or the economic criteria showing the effectiveness of using industrial units. Up to now there is even a lack of common technical conditions for the development, preparation and assembly of units. For example, according to some norms it is possible to make sixty-centimeter gaps between installations and according to others, it has to be eighty. According to some instructions it is possible to position fuel oil heaters in the same compartment with fuel pumps and according to others, this is forbidden. And so forth.

"We have still been denied the capacity of influencing the unit design process," complained Colonel F. Kapura. "For example the design organization headed by Captain 1st Rank Bystrov was charged with designing bulk assembly units using industrial models. But because of major omissions, the documentation that they issued was not used. And we had previously developed bulk units for medium pressure boiler-rooms through the efforts of a supernumerary group of enthusiasts headed by Major Stepanenko, the chief of the production department."

I should say a little more about one problem. At the present time units are not totally assembled, but are instead assembled in lighter modules in the workshop. This permits the use of standard vehicles and cranes for transportation and assembly. In the future, assembly organizations must have more powerful transportation and load-lifting equipment when preparing the larger units. And these are still not available.

The extensive spread of the unit method in construction and the realization of one of the major routes for industrializing construction are senseless without solving all of these problems. These solutions must not be shelved until the distant future.

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## MILITARY EDUCATIONAL FACILITIES

### STRUCTURE, CONTENT OF OFFICER EDUCATION DISCUSSED

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Col G. Vanyurikhin, doctor of engineering, professor: "An Experiment is Needed"]

[Text] Through my own experience I know how noticeably a student changes in the final months of his military schooling, how he literally matures before one's eyes and becomes self-confident and independent. There is nothing surprising in this. It is precisely at the end of schooling that the individual streams of knowledge merge into a single river, which gives a powerful impetus to the formative process of the future officer as a military specialist.

Why does this merging of knowledge and abilities take place primarily at the concluding stage of training? It is because this is the nature of the traditional training and educational system. It provides first for the study of general scientific and general engineering disciplines, and only then for specialized military training, which seemingly concludes the formation of the future officer-specialist.

The logic here seems obvious. First it is necessary to lay the foundation and then to construct the building itself. But experience in recent years places this in doubt. The majority of VUZ graduates entering military units are inadequately skilled in accomplishing the specific requirements of their duty assignment -- they do not succeed in developing in a relatively short period of time.

The question arises: Why not begin to master the military specialty without waiting until the completion of complete courses in higher mathematics, technical cybernetics, theory of mechanisms and machines, etc.? This would make it possible to increase the time available for the formation of the specialist and make the process of synthesis of knowledge and abilities smoother, more consistent and, consequently, also more reliable.

But will such a foundation not turn out to be too unstable?

Without delving deeply into theoretical nuances, let us note that mastering, for example, the theory of differential equations is still not laying a

foundation. It is, rather, a discussion about the foundation. Experience shows that the study of general scientific and general engineering disciplines, shorn of a practical thrust, is like filling an empty vessel with a rapidly evaporating liquid -- it is impermanent and in a certain sense abstract. Only the student's realization of the need to master (and not only memorize) theoretical questions gives fundamental, long-term knowledge. But the process of specialization calls forth this need. And the earlier it begins, the better it will turn out.

Thus we come to the advisability of at least a two-stage process of training specialists in military educational institutions. Let us imagine such a system. The entire term of study in the military school is divided into two periods. During the first three years the students study according to the program for training of technicians or platoon commanders. During the remaining two years specialization at a higher level takes place -- according to the program for training of engineers or subunit commanders.

For many this idea may seem to have been dreamed up. However, it has already left, so to speak, the shell of embryonic development and acquired numerous advocates, and, by the way, enemies as well.

The most doubts are caused by the order of learning general scientific disciplines. Can they be divided into two logically complete sections so that the first provides for the training of technicians and the second that of engineers? If this is not possible, the whole idea collapses. In this case, time must not be taken out in the first semesters for specialization training. Col V. Prokopov, faculty chief at the Kharkov Higher Military Command and Engineering School for Rocket Troops imeni MSU N. I. Krylov, along with other faculty chiefs, is proving convincingly that this task is fully realizable. The detailed training plan which they have developed, which implements the idea of two-stage training in learning one of the specialties, shows that neither a longer term of training, nor additional monetary expenditures are required for this. This plan was discussed at the inter-VUZ scientific methodological seminar and received the support of the majority of those present. Moreover, seminar participants also noted a large number of other merits of the plan.

First of all, under the new training system, the principle "from simple to complex" is more clearly implemented, and the cognitive process becomes more natural -- from physical phenomena to their essence. Under this approach, the appropriate mathematical device is used as a means, and not as an end in itself. Currently we are trying to satiate the theoretical disciplines, in particular mathematics, with practical examples. But we are not achieving any particular success. What of value can practical examples give to a student who has not been initiated into the ABC's of his specialty?

The proposed system begins with the specialty, i.e., with examples. And the movement to theoretical foundations proceeds from the examples. The difference is essential. There is substantial basis to believe that implementation of these principles, which are more appropriate to the natural process of learning new phenomena, will facilitate the assimilation of

material of those general scientific and engineering disciplines which, in the given case, will serve as the direct means of mastering the specialty.

Also not unimportant here is the fact that during the course of the three years of general training with corresponding practical training with troops in real duty positions, the student's inclinations and abilities can be tested. This means that, subsequently, specialization can be carried out more objectively and differentiated training of specialists can be realized, as is envisioned by the draft program for restructuring of the higher school. An objective basis is created for certification (including for awarding the officer's rank) of the students after the first stage of training, as well as for introducing individual training plans, elective courses and other ways of developing capabilities which have been disclosed.

Involving the military specialist faculties in schooling already in the first courses, it must be assumed, will also make it possible to improve the military education of the students, who presently deal mainly with civilian instructors of general scientific disciplines for the first two years.

Finally we approach a solution to another urgent matter, that of expanding the training of that contingent of officers with secondary specialized education. The role of technicians, as we know, will necessarily increase. And the proposed system, along with engineers, makes it possible to train not merely skilled technicians, but also to maintain the necessary correlation and to change this correlation quickly, depending on the real requirements of the troops, without carrying out any special organizational measures. An obvious merit of the "technician - engineer" system is also that it creates more opportunities to stimulate the education of the students, which naturally affects the quality of training of specialists.

The objections which some commanders and pedagogs raise to the proposed system must also be discussed here. They concern mainly whether it is morally right to offer an individual the opportunity to receive higher education and then actually graduate him with a technician's diploma. The second argument is that it is doubtful that many persons will be found who desire to enroll in such a school.

The arguments seem justified, but only at first glance. After all, the new conditions for training and graduation from the school will be widely known and each student will be given equal opportunities to receive the engineer's diploma. The difference is only that it will be attained with much more difficulty, through the process of active competition and intense study, when it will be necessary to prove through labor and its results one's capabilities and rights to this diploma. But work and only work must be the main criterion here.

Now, as for the argument that persons desiring to study under such conditions will not be found, I am convinced that this is not so. As is known, there are no fewer examinations for admittance to secondary schools than to higher schools. Yet among the students, experience shows, there are many who for various reasons would like to reduce the term of study. Some are anxious to embark upon independent activity a bit sooner, others by the middle of their



schooling marry and settle down (and there are many such), and for them the material factor begins to play an important role. A survey conducted in one of the schools, for example, shows that 90 percent of the students favored the two-stage system.

It is hardly necessary to assert that there are no difficulties or problems along the way to the introduction of this system. They do exist. It will be necessary to change training programs and teaching methods and, consequently, also to organize appropriate re-training of professors and instructors and improve the training material and, first of all the field training base. That is why I believe that it is necessary to introduce this system not in all VUZs, but to test it in one or two schools. It would be advisable to entrust the experiment to enthusiasts -- people who aspire to and can work in a new way.

Of course, neither this nor any other system can, in and of itself, solve all the problems of restructuring the military school. Much will depend on how the integration of VUZs, troop units and scientific research institutions will be carried out, how energetically active forms and methods of training will be introduced and how rapidly a comprehensive type training material base will be developed, based on the extensive use of computer equipment. It is namely under this condition that we will be able to reach a level that it will be possible not only to test completely the knowledge and skills obtained by each student, but also to place him in such conditions and involve him in such associations which will awaken the development of "slumbering" forces and capabilities.

(FROM THE EDITORS: In publishing this article by Col G. Vanyurikhin, the editors ask that leaders of military educational institutions, commanders, political workers, instructors and other readers express their opinions on the questions raised in this article.)

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## MILITARY HISTORY

### GASHKOV RECALLS CAREER OF GENERAL ANTONOV

Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by Colonel General I. Gashkov, deputy chief of the General Staff, USSR Armed Forces: "A Word About a Military Leader (On the 90th Anniversary of the Date of Birth of A. I. Antonov)"]

[Text] The brilliant constellation of commanders and military leaders brought up by the Communist Party in the years of the Great Patriotic War is well known to our people. The outcome of the battles graphically showed that in their thorough knowledge of military affairs, courage and clarity of operational thinking and breadth of strategic vision, Soviet command cadres surpassed Hitler's generals. Army General Aleksey Innokentyevich Antonov was among those who took part directly in working out operations for shifting from the defense to the offense, encircling enemy troops and, finally, completely destroying the fascist hordes.

The son of a battery commander, in his youth he dreamed about becoming a physicist or mathematician. After completing high school he attended Petersburg University. However, the death of his parents and difficult material conditions forced him to interrupt his study and become a worker. At the very height of World War I the youth was called up into the Tsarist Army. As a former student, he was sent to the Pavlovskiy Military School. In December 1916 young Warrant Officer Antonov joined a household guard jaeger regiment. He was wounded in fighting at Stanislav and awarded a medal for bravery.

The war accelerated the coming of the socialist revolution. Aleksey Antonov, who took the aspirations and fears of the people to heart, grew closer and closer to the soldiers. He was entrusted to take part in defeating the Kornilov Rebellion. And again he demonstrated personal courage. Antonov accepted the Great October Socialist Revolution with his whole heart.

In the difficult days for the young Soviet Republic, Antonov voluntarily entered the ranks of the Red Army and, as a member of the 15th Inzensk Division, took part in battles against Denikin and Wrangel. His services were noted then by presentation of an honorary weapon by the republic Revolutionary Military Soviet.

Once, at the very beginning of his military path, Antonov was asked where he learned military affairs. He answered in this way: "I completed the Pavlovskiy School, then the Southwestern Front and the battles of June 1917. Now I am studying at the fronts of the Civil War. I love to study..." And he studied his whole life. He was diligent, purposeful and persistent. This was especially true at the time he became a student at the Military Academy imeni M. V. Frunze. All of this helped, of course, when he was named senior instructor of the General Tactics faculty.

His thorough theoretical knowledge enabled Antonov rapidly to demonstrate his abilities in this new field. Along with the academy instructors he made an important contribution to the development of military science.

The war found Antonov at the post of deputy chief of staff of the Kiev Special Military District. Then he led a group assigned to form the headquarters of the Southern Front, successfully accomplished this mission and in August 1941 was named chief of staff of this very front. General Antonov already had experience in leading staffs. Back in the 1930s he worked as chief of staff of the Moscow Military District. True, the situation now was entirely different. And if Aleksey Innokentyevich solved his tasks with knowledge, this became possible only due to his uncommon organizational capabilities, high degree of knowledge of staff work and ability to foresee the enemy plans and propose methods of defeating them. A vivid confirmation of this was the first front offensive operation, conducted at Rostov, for which General Antonov was one of the sources.

In July 1942 Antonov was transferred, first to the position of chief of staff of the North Caucasus Front and then the Caucasus Front. The battle for the Caucasus became a significant step in his further development as a senior staff officer.

The Supreme High Command [VGK] Stavka noticed the brilliant gift of Aleksey Innokentyevich. On the recommendation of A. Vasilevskiy, he was summoned to Moscow and, beginning in November 1942, worked in the General Staff as chief of the Operations Administration. But recognition did not come immediately.

Here is what Vasilevskiy himself wrote about those days: "In early January, A. I. Antonov informed me at the Voronezh Front, that he had arrived to work in the Operations Administration. But, apparently, this activity did not satisfy him and he did not go to the Stavka, since F. Ye. Bokov, deputy chief of the General Staff for Organization, reported on all General Staff matters there. I phoned I. V. Stalin and, again characterizing A. I. Antonov as an exceptionally valuable worker for the General Staff and Stavka, asked that he be allowed to do work directly related to serving the Stavka in an operational respect. I. V. Stalin made no promises to me and recommended that Antonov be used as my deputy at the Voronezh Front."

Antonov's work as Stavka representative at the Voronezh, Bryansk and Central fronts was exceptionally valuable. Soon after his return to Moscow he was called to the Stavka. His report thoroughly evaluated the situation at the fronts, which helped the Stavka plan combat operations on the most important axes at the time (Orel and Kursk) and later also at the Kursk Salient.

From the 1943 summer-fall campaign until the end of the war, Antonov was directly involved in planning all the major campaigns and strategic operations. The first major strategic operation which he played a significant part in preparing and conducting was the Battle of Kursk. By this time Aleksey Innokentyevich was already first deputy chief of the General Staff. The results of this battle are well known. As one of its creators, A. Antonov was given the rank of army general and immediately awarded two orders -- Order of Suvorov First Degree and Order of the Patriotic War First Degree.

One of the classic operations of the war, the Belorussian Operation, was an important landmark in his life. He personally developed the initial variant of the Bagration Plan and then persistently followed its implementation.

And here is one more detail. A. Antonov always worked with foresight and possessed keen intuition. The map of Berlin and the areas adjacent to it appeared on Aleksey Innokentyevich's desk in the summer of 1944, during the Belorussian Operation. Already then he was making the first outlines of the operation to complete the destruction of Hitler's Germany.

At the concluding stage of the war yet another gift of General Antonov was revealed -- his tremendous tact and uncommon diplomatic abilities. He was a member of the Soviet Military Delegation at the Yalta Conference in 1944 and the Potsdam Conference in 1945.

On 17 Feb 45, in connection with the fact that A. Vasilevskiy became commander of the 3rd Belorussian Front, Army General Antonov was named chief of the General Staff, a position which he held until spring 1946. After Vasilevskiy returned to the position of chief of the General Staff, Aleksey Innokentyevich again became his first deputy. In 1948 Antonov was sent to the Transcaucasus Military district, where he commanded for more than four years.

An important stage in his biography was his work in the position of chief of staff of the Combined Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty Organization States, which he headed for seven years.

Army General Antonov died at his post on 18 Jun 62. Antonov had a high duty position and a high rank. He received many high awards. But he did not become big headed. He was modest and unpretentious. All of those who served under his command remembered the general in this way.

9069

CSO: 1801/06

## MILITARY HISTORY

MAJOR GENERAL SKORODUMOV RECALLS MEETING OF ROKOSSOVSKIY, GAREYEV

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Sep 86 p 2

[Article by Maj Gen I. Skorodumov: "Unforgettable Lessons"]

[Text] During the war we heard a great deal about MSU Konstantin Konstantinovich Rokossovskiy. And of course I wanted, if only with one eye as we say, to see the famed commander, about whose skill in questions of operational art and tactics, bravery, demandingness, love for his soldiers and other professional and purely human qualities at the front, there were literally legends. At that time, unfortunately, this did not happen. Only a little more than 10 years after the end of the war did we meet. It was completely unexpected for me.

In summer 1957 a two-sided exercise of the Belorussian and Moscow military district headquarters was underway. I, then a lieutenant colonel, was among the group of officers in the "West" headquarters. On one of these days we drove in a downpour to the forward command post. We were there by dawn. Having detailed the situation with the staffs and noted it on our maps, we began to wait for MSU S. Timoshenko, commander of the "West" troops, upon whose arrival it was planned that the active operations of the two sides were to begin.

Time passed and he did not come. Someone even joked that the start of active operations is to be postponed until the rain ends. But all of our joviality immediately stopped when it became known that active operations were already in progress. We grabbed the telephones in order to call the headquarters and find out necessary information about the course of the offensive by our troops, but nothing happened. None of us were able to get through. The telephones were silent. This continued for more than an hour. Now we already thought that hopefully the commander would be held up somewhere a bit longer. You see, we were unable to report the situation to him.

When finally the telephones "came to life," we found out to our amazement that the exercise was taking place not at all according to the planned scenario. In three hours of the offensive the "West" troops, contrary to our suppositions, had advanced only a few kilometers. We were inclined to blame this turn of events on excessive fault-finding by the umpires.



The command, "Comrade Officers!" brought us out of our state of hesitation and doubt. Accompanied by Col M. Gareyev (today a colonel general) and an officer from the military district headquarters, MSU K. Rokossovskiy entered the tent.

We all, of course, knew that Konstantin Konstantinovich had recently returned from Poland, where at the request of the leaders of that country he had worked since 1949 at the post of Minister of National Defense and Deputy Chairman of the PNR [Polish People's Republic] Council of Ministers, after which he was named USSR Deputy Minister of Defense. But to meet him here? No one expected this. But Rokossovskiy took off his raincoat and warmly greeted and shook hands with all those present. Then he came up to me and asked me to report the situation.

I began to report, and since the marshal listened attentively and somehow even encouragingly, I decided at the end to complain about the poor communications and at the same time to bait the umpires, who, I said were suppressing us and not allowing us to succeed.

Rokossovskiy listened to all that I had to say and to the "grievances" of the other officers and asked, with a sly grin:

"Do you think that if you had struck the "enemy" first that you would already have victory in your pocket? No, it does not always happen that way in war. This time the "east" responded with a no less powerful strike. First of all against your control post.

And only then did we finally realize that it was no accident that the telephones had gone dead and the exercise play was not developing according to plan. All of these inputs were made at the hands of Rokossovskiy himself. The famed commander again showed convincingly that in military training there is no place for indulgences, oversimplifications and stereotyped solutions. And the marshal did this entirely unexpectedly. Having disclosed the shortcomings in the actions of the staff officers, he did not begin to dress us down, as some commanders did at times, it must be confessed. He made his remarks tactfully.

Rokossovskiy hurried on to one of the headquarters. Lt Col Kushch, who recently returned from there, was called upon to show him how to get there, although he had just concluded two days of traveling with almost no rest. When Konstantin Konstantinovich had left, Col Gareyev discussed the lesson which Rokossovskiy had given him personally. It happened that while they were going together to our tent the marshal struck a telephone cable in the dark and fell. Having stood up he remarked: "During the war we always buried the cable at the command posts."

"That is restraint!" said Col Gareyev. "You will agree that not everyone in such a situation would so tactfully, I would say, intelligently comport himself!"

Soon Lt Col Kushch arrived and told us about his trip with the marshal. The officer fell asleep in the vehicle. As the adjutant later told Kushch, he



wanted to wake him up, but Konstantin Konstantinovich did not allow the adjutant to do so.

"We will get there," said the marshal. "Let the man rest. By the way, at the front I frequently slept only in the vehicle."

Many years have passed since that meeting. But it remains in my memory down to the tiniest details. This is probably because the lessons which the marshal taught us even today have not lost their relevance.

9069

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## MILITARY HISTORY

### KRASNAYA ZVEZDA RECALLS CAREER OF I. P. UBOREVICH

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 6 Sep 86 p 4

[Article by Col N. Azovtsev (retired), doctor of historical sciences, professor, Honored Scientist of the RSFSR: "Army Commander Uborevich"]

[Text] Speaking at the ceremony dedicated to awarding Vladivostok the Order of Lenin, M. S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee General Secretary, named I. P. Uborevich among the glorious heroes of the Soviet homeland. I would like to read about his life and activity on the pages of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. (Captain A. Frolushkin)

In the early 1930's I served in the Special Red Banner Far Eastern Army. In our 40th Rfl Div there were many experienced commanders and political workers who told us young soldiers about the heroic feats of Civil War participants, about the days at Volochayevka and of the nights of the assault on Spassk. We were especially interested in the story of Iyeronim Petrovich Uborevich, military minister of the Far Eastern Republic and commander of its People's Revolutionary Army.

He was named to this high post in August 1922, already having tremendous combat experience behind him. On 3 June 1922 the Red Army High Certification Commission recognized him as deserving of transfer to the position of commander of front forces and attached him to the General Staff. "Comrade Uborevich, Iyeronim Petrovich, who has been in the glorious ranks of the Workers' and Peasants' Army from the moment of its creation, displayed his exceptional military gifts and solid theoretical training, which he acquired through persistent personal labor under conditions of continuous combat operations at the fronts," it was noted in the commission's decision.

I. P. Uborevich was born on 14 January 1896 in the village of Antandriyus, today Utenskiy Rayon, LaSSR. Upon completing Dvinsk high school in 1913 he entered the Petersburg Polytechnical Institute. For his participation in its student revolutionary circle and for his agitation he was expelled. He was called into the army during World War I. In 1916 he completed the Konstantinovsk Artillery School in Petrograd and was sent into the active army in the rank of second lieutenant. Immediately following the February Revolution, in March 1917, he entered the ranks of the Bolshevik Party, and to

the end of his days remained an active fighter for the cause of the workers and peasants.

I. P. Uborevich is among the talented military leaders who came from the depth of the popular masses and was brought up by the Communist Party. He was among the first organizers and leaders of the Red Guard Ranks in Bessarabia. In December 1917 he was selected as commander of a revolutionary workers' and peasants' regiment. In January-February 1918 this regiment waged a successful battle against Romanian and Austro-German occupiers.

At the end of 1918 a difficult situation developed on the Northern Front. The interventionists launched an offensive and dreamed about seizing Petrograd and Moscow. V. I. Lenin considered the Northern Front "especially dangerous, because the enemy is located there in the most advantageous conditions, having a sea route..."

In this front I. P. Uborevich distinguished himself as an artillery instructor, commander of the Kotlas Heavy Howitzer Battery, and then the Nizhne-Dvinsk Bde. He was not yet 23 years old when, in December 1918, he was promoted to the position of commander, 18th Rfl Div, 6th Army. The young division commander justified the trust placed in him with honor. The units of his division dealt telling blows to the interventionist troops and White Guards. In one of his reports, the army commissar noted that division commander I. P. Uborevich inspired his troops with his personal bravery and was an example of valor and selflessness. He was awarded the Order of the Red Banner for his decisiveness, boldness and capable leadership of the combat operations of his troops.

In fall 1919 a grave danger developed on the Southern Front, especially on the Tula-Moscow Axis. Denikin assigned his troops the mission of seizing Moscow before the onset of winter. The RKP(b) [Workers' and Peasants' Party (of Bolsheviks)] Central Committee demanded that all party organizations, "no matter what, at the cost of whatever casualties and losses, beat back Denikin's offensive and defend Tula with its factories and Moscow, and then...shift to the offensive..."

The RKP(b) Central Committee sent a number of prominent party officials and military personnel to the Southern Front. I. P. Uborevich was named commander of the 14th Army, and G. K. Ordzhonikidze was a member of its Revolutionary Military Soviet. Their harmonious work was subordinated to the single goal of defeating the enemy. I. P. Uborevich did not sit in the army headquarters. He appeared continuously, first at the front, then in the rear, and he established revolutionary discipline in the units and inspired the troops. A fierce battle took place at Orel and Kromy. Troops of the 14th Army, in coordination with 13th Army units, dealt a crushing defeat to the enemy strike grouping.

In early 1920 Denikin's army was split into three parts. The largest grouping was retreating to the North Caucasus. M. N. Tukhachevskiy, Caucasus Front commander, requested of the republic Revolutionary Military Soviet that Uborevich command the 9th Army. This request was granted.

In the first half of March 1920, the 9th Army was nearing Yekaterinodar (Krasnodar). The army commander decided to attack the city from front and flanks. The Whites retreated to Novorossiysk, under the protection of British and French ships. Neither the defensive fire of the battery, nor the desperate resistance of the White Guards could stop the troops of the 8th and 9th armies. The liberation of all the North Caucasus from the Whites became an established fact. By a resolution of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee] on 8 Apr 20, Army Commander I. P. Uborevich was awarded an honorary revolutionary weapon. Soon he was again commanding the 14th Army, Southwestern Front, which was participating actively in fierce battles against the White Poles.

In July 1920, when Wrangel was threatening our troops on the Southwestern Front, Uborevich was named commander of the 13th Army, which in coordination with the 2d Cavalry and 6th armies, was participating in destroying the main grouping of Wrangel's troops at Severnaya Tavriya. Fulfilling the directives of M. V. Frunze, Southern Front commander, the army commander organized pursuit of the enemy, as a result of which the enemy positions in the area of Berdyansk and Melitopol were penetrated. For his able command, Iyeronim Petrovich was awarded a second Order of the Red Banner.

After the defeat of Wrangel, Uborevich took part in eliminating the remnants of counterrevolution in the Ukraine, Belorussia, Tambov Guberniya and Eastern Siberia. Under his leadership the Coastal Operation was worked out and conducted, during which the "Far Eastern Verdun," Spassk Fortress, was stormed. On 25 October 1922 the People's Revolutionary Army and partisans entered Vladivostok. The last interventionists were chased out and Soviet authority was restored in the Far East.

For his successful leadership of his troops, personal valor and courage in the battles, I. P. Uborevich was awarded his third Order of the Red Banner.

After the Civil War, I. P. Uborevich commanded an army and the troops of the North Caucasus, Moscow and Belorussian military districts. From 1926 he was a member of the USSR Revolutionary Military Soviet [RVS], and in 1930-1931 he was USSR RVS Deputy Chairman and RKKA [Workers' and Peasants' Red Army] chief of armaments. From 1934 on he was a member of the Military Soviet of the USSR People's Commissariat of Defense. Iyeronim Petrovich devoted his efforts, knowledge and rich combat experience to strengthening the defense capability of the country and developing Soviet military science and military art.

I. P. Uborevich wrote the works: "The Importance of Maneuver in the Civil War," "The Principles of Combat and Their Importance in Indoctrinating and Training the Red Army," "The Training of RKKA Command Personnel (Senior and Higher)," "Tactical Training of Troops in Summer," "Operational-Tactical and Air War Games," and others.

With great skill he conducted command and staff games and exercises, invariably achieved great dynamism in the course of the training battle, created a complex situation and made the games as close as possible to real conditions. "Do not destroy in exercises the independent thinking and will of the students; create for them conditions enabling them to display their own

initiative," advised Uborevich. His statements are relevant to the present day, and are directed against "omniscient airs" and stereotyped solutions.

"None of the commanders gave as much to the operational-tactical training of large unit commanders and staffs as did I. P. Uborevich..." noted MSU G. K. Zhukov in his book, "Vospominaniya i Razmyshleniya" [Remembrances and Reflections].

In November 1935 I. P. Uborevich, among five prominent Red Army commanders, was awarded the military rank of Army Commander First Rank. He carried out important public and party work. From 1922 he was a member of the USSR TsIK [Central Executive Committee]. At the 16th and 17th party congresses he was elected a candidate member of the RKP(b) Central Committee.

I. P. Uborevich did not live to see the Great Patriotic War. But his work played a role in our great victory. Even today a number of the postulates which he advanced in the area of indoctrinating and training the troops in the art of victory have retained their theoretical and practical importance.

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## FOREIGN MILITARY AFFAIRS

### KRASNAYA ZVEZDA DETAILS U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS STOCKPILES

Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Jul 86 p 3

[Article by Col (Res) V. Chernyshev, Candidate of Technical Sciences: "Without Considering the Sovereignty of Others: Where and How Washington is Deploying Its Nuclear Weapons"]

[Text] The world community has just been given further proof that the Pentagon has granted itself the "right" to be the boss over its nuclear weapons on the territory of other nations. It has already been reported that a list of 20 bases in Europe and the Far East where aircraft of the U.S. Air Force with nuclear bombs are on alert round-the-clock was included in published stenographic records of hearings in one of Congress' subcommittees. The list names five bases in the GDR, five in Turkey, three in England, three in Italy and one each in the Netherlands, Belgium, Greece and South Korea.

The secret list, included in the stenographic record either inadvertently or deliberately, was prepared by the Pentagon to inform the Congress where the Defense Department intends to build secret storage facilities for additional nuclear aerial bombs. According to the stenographic record the U.S. Air Force has presently built two such storage facilities at Ramstein [Air] Base in the FRG. The newspaper TOKYO SHIMBUN states that the United States named for the first time a base at Kunsan in South Korea, where, among other things, it plans to build a storage facility for nuclear munitions.

According to Pentagon representatives the secret storage facilities will make it possible to deploy together the fighter-bombers and the nuclear weapons for them, which will "considerably enhance combat readiness." American experts in arms control have a different opinion. W. Arkin, one of the authors of the well-known book "Nuclear Battlefields: Global Ties in the Arms Race," for example, called the program another step in preparations for a nuclear war.

The objective of the "undertaking" by the Pentagon is to enhance the USA's capability for inflicting a first nuclear strike against the USSR and other socialist nations. One automatically recalls how, during the "cold war" years, the American strategists cynically "justified" encircling the Soviet Union with a ring of military bases. This is what General G. Kenney, commander of the U.S. Strategic Air Command, said in 1948, for example: "The American strategists are thinking about closing the ring of air bases around Russia, making it increasingly smaller and tighter until the Russians are strangled. This involves moving the bases closer

and closer to the heart of the Russian land and then using these bases... for continuous bombing and shelling with guided projectiles."

Here is a "revelation" of quite recent times. In the heat of debate P. Nitze, presently special adviser to the President and the U.S. Secretary of State, expressed the secret idea of the Washington strategists: "If you do not accept our proposals," he told a Soviet representative, "we shall encircle you with a first echelon of Pershing II missiles and a second echelon of cruise missiles so that you will be unable even to move."

And so, they began by creating a "solid ring of air bases," continued with an encirclement with Pershing II and cruise missiles and, according to retired Presidential Assistant for National Security R. McFarlane, are also developing a "space cover" over the Soviet Union. And it all goes counter to the interests of their own people, the interests of their own allies and the interests of all mankind.

It is noted with indignation in the world that Washington treats nuclear weapons as though they were harmless objects which can be deployed in any nation which suits the Pentagon, in anyone else's home, without the consent of or even the knowledge of the owners. U.S. representatives attempt "to prove" that "there is no danger in this." Participants in the antinuclear movement have responded sarcastically to such assertions: "If it is so safe, then deploy the nuclear weapons in Washington, test them in Paris and dump the radioactive waste in Tokyo."

The American strategists are not disturbed, however. They are deploying nuclear weapons both in the USA and in other nations. According to the American experts, nuclear munitions have now been stockpiled in 28 states in the USA. This includes 1,962 nuclear warheads in South Carolina, 1,900 in New York and 1,510 in North Dakota. With respect to tactical nuclear weapons, 70 percent of them are deployed outside the USA: in the FRG, England, Italy, Greece, Turkey, the Netherlands, Belgium and South Korea. Facilities of the so-called "nuclear infrastructure," designated for control and communication of the nuclear forces, guiding nuclear weapons and so forth, are located in 40 nations of the world. These facilities and nuclear weapons storage facilities make those nations not only "nuclear catapults" but also nuclear hostages of the Pentagon.

American assertions about strictly respecting the sovereignty of allies, "open consultations" with partners on security matters and so forth, continue to be a propaganda screen behind which the Pentagon monopolistically controls the fate of nations and peoples. The routes of "migration" of components of the USA's nuclear arsenal are sometimes unknown not only to the general public but even to the governments of those states in whose territories the oversea "guests" are secretly registered.

Let us recall just a few cases from recent times. In January 1985 reports were leaked to the Western press that portable nuclear munitions had been secretly stockpiled at American bases in the FRG, Italy and South Korea. Up to 300 units of these munitions, designated for use in the interior of enemy territory, according to West German experts, were deployed in the FRG. Up to 100 units, it turned out, were stored at U.S. military bases at Bad Telze and near Mainz (Finten). When Bundestag Deputy R. Scheffberger asked the command element at the base at Bad

Telce to explain the munitions, U.S. military authorities absolutely refused to do so. The fact was thereby demonstrated once again that Washington does not care a bit about the FRG's sovereignty.

Secret plans by Washington to deploy American nuclear weapons in Canada, Spain, Puerto Rico, Iceland, on the Azores, in the Philippines and in Bermuda "in case a state of alert was announced" for the American armed forces became known soon after that. They involved nuclear depth bombs for the R-3 Orion or other aircraft of the naval aviation. They were to be used for destroying submarines or blockading underwater routes and passageways for submarines. According to the American plans, Spain's "share" was to be 32 bombs, Iceland's 46, and the Philippines' 227.

Washington attempted to suppress the scandal surrounding this. New details of the "emergency plans" which fell into the hands of the press, however, forced American officials to admit that such plans exist. Even such loyal Washington followers as NATO Secretary General Carrington was clearly "disturbed." The NEW YORK TIMES stated that Carrington announced that "it would not be a bad idea to consult with the nations involved when planning for emergency situations." In an interview with McCLEAN'S MAGAZINE, Admiral R. Fold, former head of Canada's defense staff, expressed himself in far more specific terms: "The United States has a moral duty to consult with us about the use of our territory for purposes involving nuclear weapons, which evoke such a violent reaction. It is simply immoral to prepare plans without consulting the parties involved."

The moral aspect does not concern official Washington, however. In typical fashion it reacted to the world community's indignation and the dissatisfaction of its allies with the following: the appearance of new reports on the "nuclear subject" could contribute to the intensification of the "nuclear allergy" in the world. This is how the "threat" was regarded in the American capital!

In the meantime more and more information has become known to the public. The London OBSERVER, for example, in response to a statement by U.S. Assistant Defense Secretary for Nuclear Energy R. Wagner, reported on the existence of a "secret plan for deploying in Western Europe new nuclear artillery munitions which have an effect like that of neutron bombs." "The neutron cores for them," American General B. Rogers, Supreme Commander of NATO Allied Forces in Europe, cynically announced, "can be kept in the USA until the colic caused in our allies by these weapons passes."

Finally, one other instance: In 1985 the FRG's Bundestag learned that the USA was probably intending to deploy in Western Europe far more of its Pershing II missiles than previously planned. The magazine STERN then reported that "additional missile parts" were stored at a depot at Weilerbach in the state of Rhineland-Palatinate. This "ominous" stockpile of Pershing missiles, the magazine stressed, explained why the Pentagon had ordered from Martin Marietta not 108 missiles (in accordance with the NATO decision) but 258--that is, 150 units more. There was no reply at that time to a question about these facts by Bundestag Deputy H. Scheer.

However, a statement by U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense R. Perle to the effect that Washington wants to deploy its "capability for conducting war as close

to the enemy as possible"--that is, to the USSR and the other socialist nations--can be considered to be a frank "answer" to this and other questions. With respect to the sovereignty of allies and respect for their opinion and security interests, this has never concerned and does not concern the U.S. administration. Washington's nuclear adventurism is universally accompanied by gross interference by the USA in the affairs of other nations and universally poses a threat to peace and international security.

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## AFGHANISTAN

### GUERRILLA DEFECTOR RELATES EXPERIENCES

Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Aug 86 p 3

[Article by A. Borovik, special KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent in Kabul:  
"A Future Invasion"]

[Text] Today is a national holiday in Afghanistan -- Independence Day. The DRA is confidently advancing down the path toward revolutionary transformation under the difficult conditions of an undeclared war that was unleashed by the U.S. and regional reactions.

Aminulla, a seven year old boy, had only seen night for months. With no moon and stars. With no father and mother. Without his brother and sisters. Away from the town where he was born and grew up. The night absorbed everything except sound. This began when he and his parents were returning to Bagram in an old, rickety bus. They were about ten kilometers from their home when something suddenly blew up underneath, tossed the vehicle and turned it on its side. It was a mine which killed his father and wounded his mother. The child received a severe contusion and lost his sight. He lay in a Kabul hospital for a long time, but after many difficulties, much medicine and a lot of crying by the child, the Afghan doctors got the child's sight back for him. Since then he has been afraid of night's advance.

I remembered about this little boy when I bade farewell to a man by the name of Said Muhammad Shakh on the porch of a small villa belonging to Afghanistan's Ministry of State Security in the center of Kabul. He in his own way had to go through this same process -- recovering his sight after long years of blindness.

One of the ideologists of the counterrevolution and the author of a thick treatise on anti-communism, he had exhorted murderers and had been an "ecclesiastic" pastor of the spirit.

Said Muhammad Shakh was from a well-to-do family and had received his theological education at Kabul University. He was adopted into the most Black-Hundred circle where even Daud's reactionary regime seemed extremely "pink." Soon after the victory of the April revolution he deserted Afghanistan and joined the counterrevolution.



Said himself told me all of this while using his hand to stroke the broad, thick black beard that bordered his dark, young face. The room was dark and it was becoming progressively more difficult to write down his story-confession with every minute.

"Could we turn on a light?"

"It is better that we don't. I love the dark. Everything seems OK in the dark," he answered.

"What do you mean, if it isn't a secret?"

"Oh, I have rethought many things here. Very, very many things."

People in the Ministry of State Security had warned me that everything he "says" is now being confirmed. It is impossible to totally believe him. However much of what he has related corresponds to information that has come in from other sources.

He had penetrated into Afghanistan as part of an armed band of Dushman. Slipping several dozen kilometers into the heart of the territory, Said gave up his weapon, left the bandits and, in the guise of a common peasant, entered the small kishlak where his parents live to this day.

"I had not seen my father and mother for eight years," smiled Said. "I missed them, so I returned home."

No, this isn't the real reason. Afghan Chekists have good reason to suggest another reason for the "prodigal son's" return home. This man, who had undergone professional training in special propaganda during his years of emigration, had the following mission: to sow discord among the population and incite the people against the national authorities. In short, to change the people's minds. But another fate was in store for him. His stay in Afghanistan changed his mind. It turned out that he had fallen victim to that same shameless anti-revolutionary propaganda that he himself had worked with all of the last eight years.

The return of Said Muhammad Shakh's sight began at the moment he penetrated into his paternal kishlak. And there thunder struck in broad daylight: it turned out that his father, his rich, wise father, had taken the revolution's side.

He had understandably not become a communist in the weeks that he spend in his motherland. And he does not plan to become one. Said's basic religious directions remain as they were. But his Afghanistan had changed during his absence. He has been convinced that no one here plans to spread atheism by force. That the country's leadership piously protects the traditions of their forefathers. That Islam here is more secure than in many Muslim countries. That the mullah in the kishlak, the most impoverished of the clergy, receive tangible material assistance from the state. That the government has proclaimed freedom to practice religious ceremonies and support to believers.

"I was very surprised," says Said after dropping into one of the mosques while morning services were in progress. After kneeling toward Mecca, the people slowly and mournfully began their usual prayers. And no one drove anyone away.

But more than that, he was surprised when he saw with his own eyes that land had not been taken from any of the believers, from land owners who were conducting a highly marketable economy and selling their goods to the state at stable purchase prices or from tribal elders and leaders who served the people. And only recently, when he was in Pakistan for the first time and then in Iran, he had truly believed that outrages against Islam and the land were taking place in his motherland.

Of course things had not gone smoothly during the land reform for everyone in Afghanistan. And Said was well aware of this. It was the Dushman who were putting up every possible obstacle in the path of land reform. As a result, a paradox had developed. Many peasants who had fallen to anti-revolutionary propaganda not only were not trying to obtain land, but on the contrary wanted to return it to Allah and to the former feudal lords. The Dushman were doing everything possible to spread rumors about how the government in Kabul was just about to fall and how everyone who had "cooperated" with the "unfaithful ones" would be held very severely responsible. They intimidated and killed people. And therefore by 1980 only 180,000 Afghan families were involved in cooperatives. And yet a short time after the revolution everything had gone forward and the government had rescinded peasant debts totaling 33 million afghani and liberated 80 percent of the population from a lifetime of bondage.

Today the country's leadership is actively assisting landowners. And this is understandable. If the peasant masses, and they make up approximately ninety percent of the population, are progressively and more consistently on the side of the revolution, the stabilization process will go much faster. However there is still a lot that must be done. Manual labor predominates in the villages.

Said notes, "I was surprised when I saw people here who had just recently been out of the country, but who had nonetheless received land allotments after their return home."

We still hadn't put a lamp on; evening was falling and I was already having trouble seeing the lines in my notebook. A young man who had appeared at the door placed a tray with two small cups of strong black coffee on the coffee table where we were talking.

Said quietly talked about his meeting with peasants on Afghan soil. He spoke English, but in his own Afghan way. However he pronounced several words just as they would be pronounced by a person who had spent a long time in the U.S.

When the State Security officials had brought him to Kabul and placed him in this villa, Said had asked about a trip around the city.

He saw new things everywhere. Road traffic had increased drastically and there were many buses. He caught the eyes of traffic controllers several times.

Said was first taken to the bazaar, a real indicator of the business activity in any eastern city. There was an abundance of vegetables, fruit, meat, milk and starchy products. And only a month ago Said had been painting an inspired picture of the suffering of "starving" Kabul to all who wanted to listen to him.

He was allowed to get out of the vehicle on the main commercial street, Mayvand. Everything is available in the stalls. Of course the prices on imported goods are very high. But this is in no way because of state duties, for they are within the normal range. There is another reason -- the merchants who bring goods into the Kabul marketplace have to pay of the Dushman who are active on the roads.

Goods move briskly. The private sector is active and is set up in a friendly manner. According to statistics there is a total of 274 private enterprises registered in Afghanistan and this is a real force in this country. But the equipment almost everywhere is old and labor productivity is low. Therefore at the present time a system of favorable crediting for small and medium owners is being approved in the DRA. Increasing the activity of private capital increases the volume of the total of goods produced and stabilizes market prices. And the attraction of the patriotically inclined private craftsman to public production is being strictly monitored by the state.

In other words, life convincingly shows that the private owner exists in Afghanistan and despite the recent assertions of Said himself, he is secure.

The Afghan economy is picking up speed, although the government is forced to spend a great amount of its assets on defensive needs. And the total volume of the national product increased the past year relative to 1978 indicators.

They showed the ex-Dushman one of the oldest sites of cooperation between Afghanistan and the USSR, the Dzhangalak Automotive Repair Factory. Said had seen it before, but had never been inside. The trade union organization there numbers 1000 people and in recent years worker salaries have more than doubled. The factory has clubs designed to eliminate illiteracy and 450 people have learned to read and write. And although the overall statistics on popular education are still sad (the Dushman killed almost two thousand teachers) Afghan educational agencies are working untiringly. The republic now has 4,500 schools attended by 1,500,000 children. And for the first time teaching is being done in the languages of the many nationalities that populate the country.

It is difficult. It is incredibly difficult to educate a country which before the war was considered one of the most backward in the world, a country in which only eight years ago more than 90 percent of the population was illiterate.

The dissatisfaction with what has been done and the sharp criticism of the shortcomings that are hampering progress were heard at a recent NDPA [National Democratic Party of Afghanistan] Central Committee Plenum. Having adopted a course toward accelerating the strengthening of the revolution's economic base, the party at the same time has exerted every effort to expand its social support. The essence of this policy includes attracting allies from the most diverse social strata to manage the government (at all levels).

The vehicle in which Said sat with two Afghan security agents moved from the factory toward micro-district No 3 where new residential buildings were being erected. People who had previously huddled together in clay houses on the outskirts of the city were able to use electricity and running water for the first time and were able to send their children to a near-by, well-furnished school. The new buildings were constructed by the Kabul Home Construction Combine. And although after the April Revolution's victory the combine had constructed quarters for more than 40,000 families, its capacity is clearly lacking at the present time. The problem of expanding the combine has been on the agenda for a long time.

After a few short minutes of rapid traveling the vehicle stops at the gate of the DRA Central Military Hospital. This was a huge, bright building with a labyrinth of corridors and glass passages. Lads from the Afghan Central Committee did not fail to report that after the April Revolution the country had begun an experiment, the introduction of free medical assistance, that was unprecedented in its history.

"When they told me about this," Said smiled, "I sadly recalled the appendicitis operation that I had undergone in the early seventies. It had cost my family six thousand afghani."

It is still unclear what will happen to Said in the future. One thing is clear, however: he had entered Afghanistan fully convinced that he would detect a "Soviet invasion" here, but he detected something totally different -- the future had invading the backward country.

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AFGHANISTAN

ALLEGED GUERRILLA CHEMICAL USE LINKED TO BINARY ARMS

Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Sep 86 p 3

[Article by A. Goltz: "They Have 'Silent Death' in their Arsenals"]

[Text] The Bakhtar Agency has issued a statement reporting that the Armed Forces of Afghanistan seized an enormous lot of chemical ammunition during military operations against the Dushman. According to testimony from former counterrevolutionaries who had come over to the national authorities, Dushman bands have been given instructions to begin using chemical weapons not only against the armed forces, but also against the peaceful DRA population.

Judging from everything available, the American special operations which directly control the Dushman have conceived new, large-scale provocation with chemical weapons. And it is aimed at a long-range goal. The American Congress will again soon vote on allocating assets for the production of binary chemical weapons. Judging from the materials in the American press and statements by U.S. political figures, many legislators have planned to come out decisively against the production of a new variety of "silent death."

The Administration and the Pentagon are feverishly looking for arguments with which to force Congress to approve "chemical rearmament." For example, the NEW YORK TIMES ran an article by Director Adelman of the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency in which he attempted to prove that the production of binary ammunition would facilitate progress in the negotiations on totally banning chemical weapons.

But just as before, Washington's main bet is on provocation. It is, in general, not very complicated. Chemical weapons were transferred to Dushman bands. At the right time they would use these weapons against the peaceful inhabitants. And the mass media agencies that are obedient to the administration would again raise the evil howl about how mythical "Soviet manufactured chemical weapons" are being used in Afghanistan. And as a result Congress would allocate assets for binary weapons.

But Afghan Army operations disrupted the provocateurs' schemes and they were caught red-handed. The weapons that were seized in Afghanistan are just one piece of evidence that convicts the criminals who are planning to conduct chemical warfare against the population.

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